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by Janine P Geske & William C. Gleisner III 
n March 31,2005, in Supreme Court Order (SCO) 03-06, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court repealed the frivolous action rules contained in Wis. Stat. sections 802.05 and 
814.025, effective July 1, 2005, and replaced them with new Rule 802.05.1 This 
article briefly discusses the history of the frivolous action law in Wisconsin and the 
dissenting justices' objections to the new ??le.2 The article also discusses several 
important considerations relative to seeking and resisting sanctions enforcement 
actions under new Rule 802.05, including: 1) whether the frivolous action rule 
should be applied retroactively to actions already pending as of July 1, 2005; and 
2) what sanctions can and should be imposed for violating the rule. 
The History of Frivolous Action Law in Wisconsin 
The frivolous action rules in former Wis. Stat. sections 802.05 and 814.025 were 
adopted in 1978. Under former section 802.05, a trial court had discretion to im-
pose a sanction on finding that a party had filed a petition, motion, or other paper 
in bad faith, but that section provided little guidance as to the nature or extent of 
any possible sanction. Under former section 814.025, once a court made a finding 
of frivolousness under that section, the section required the court to award the 
party that moved for such a finding its costs and reasonable attorney fees. As a con-
sequence, the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded in Jandrt v. Jerome Foods 
Inc. 3 that it had to uphold an award of $716,081 in costs and attorney fees against a 
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Milwaukee law firm pursuant to section 
814.025. In evaluating the reasonable-
ness of an award of alleged costs and 
attorney fees, the Jandrt court further 
instructed trial courts that awards under 
section 814.025 could "fully compen-
sate" an aggrieved party for its alleged 
harm because of a finding of frivolous-
ness under the section. As the supreme 
comt stated in Jandrt: 
"Because the circuit court properly 
found that the Previant firm frivolously 
continued the underlying action, and we 
affi??, sanctions in this case are manda-
tory. See Wis. Stat. § 814.025(1) ... The 
Previant finn ??????that while the sanc-
tion is mandatory, the amount awarded 
is not reasonable and is contrary to the 
purpose of Wis. Stat. § 814.025 which 
it believes is to deter litigants and at-
torneys from commencing or continuing 
frivolous actions and to punish those 
who do so. While we agree with the 
Previant firm that deterrence and pun-
ishment are the underlying purposes 
of§ 814.025, ... we are less convinced 
that compensation is not an appropri-
ate consideration. Certainly, deterrence 
and punishment of an attorney or party 
who maintains a frivolous action is not 
inconsistent with fully compensating an 
opposing party for the costs and attor-
neys fees required to defend a frivolous 
action."~ 
The Jandrt decision and the comt's 
interpretation of former sections 802.05 
and 814.025 generated controversy 
and calls for reform, which eventually 
led to the filing of petitions to and the 
holding of bearings before the Wis-
consin Supreme Court. The criticisms 
centered on the fact that Wisconsin's 
frivolous action rules had not changed 
since their adoption in the mid 1970s 
although Rule 11 ofthe Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (FRCP 11), on which 
the Wisconsin rules were modeled, had 
undergone changes, the most significant 
of which occurred in 1993. 
The Wisconsin Judicial Council first 
sought reform in a petition filed in Octo-
ber 2000, asking that the supreme court 
consider several proposed changes to 
the frivolous action rules, including the 
introduction of a 14-day "safe harbor" 
provision. Under that provision, no ac-
tion or sanction could be imposed on a 
party charged \vith the frivolous fiJing of 
a co??t document, if the party withdrew 
the filing within 14 days of service of a 
motion on the party so charged. 
While the Judicial Council did not 
call for adopting FRCP 11, as amended 
in 1993, a 2001 filing of the Wisconsin 
Academy of Trial La??ers ?? support of 
the Judicial Council's petition did call 
for its adoption. Following a ovember 
2001 hearing on the Judicial Council's 
petition, the supreme coUJt in SCO 99-
07 denied the Judicial Council's petition 
on Jan. 29, 2002. 
On July 8, 2003, joint petition 03-06 
was filed \vith the supreme court seeking 
repeal of sections 802.05 and 814.025 
and asking the court to adopt FRCP 
11, as amended in 1993, by means of 
enacting amended Rule 802.05. This 
petition had wide support from both 
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the plaintiffs' bar and the defense bar, 
as evidenced by coauthorship of the 
petition by the Wisconsin chapter of the 
American Board of Trial Advocates, the 
Civil Trial Counsel of Wisconsin, the 
State Bar Litigation Section, and the 
Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
The petition asserted that when first 
adopted, sections 802.05 and 814.025 
were patterned after the OJiginal FRCP 
11, and that fi·om time to time Wis-
consin appellate courts have looked to 
federal court decisions in interpreting 
and applying these statutes. The joint 
petition noted that in Jandrt, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court did in fact look 
to federal decisions interpreting FRCP 
11 (albeit decisions interpreting FRCP 
11 before its amendment in 1993). The 
joint petition also noted that there had 
been no substantive changes in the Wis-
consin rules governing ftivolous filings 
since they were adopted in 1978, but 
that FRCP 11 had undergone substan-
tial revision, most notably in 1993. As 
stated in the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to FRCP 11, the 1993 
amendments "were intended to remedy 
problems that have arisen in the inter-
pretation and application of the 1983 
revisions of the rule." 
Joint petition 03-06 further argued 
that there were no unique aspects of 
Wisconsin practice that would justi?Y 
departing from the approach taken by 
the federal courts under FRCP 11, as 
amended in 1993. The petition also 
argued that by adopting FRCP 11, as 
amended in 1993, Wisconsin attorneys 
and courts would be able to look to 
applicable decisions of federal courts 
since 1993 for guidance in interpreting 
and applying the mandates of FRCP 11 
in Wisconsin. 
Joint petition 03-06 recommended 
adopting the 1993 Federal Advisory 
Committee Notes to FHCP 11 to guide 
the bench and bar in arriving at reason-
able interpretations of a Wisconsin ver-
sion of?F?CP 11. Those notes specified 
in part that "?FRCP 11, as amended in 
1993] does not attempt to enumerate 
the factors a court should consider in 
deciding whether to impose a sanction 
or what sanctions would be appropriate 
in the circumstances; but, for emphasis, 
it does specifically note that a sanction 
may be nonmonetary as well as mon-
etary. ?hether the improper conduct 
was willful, or negligent; whether it 
was part of a pattern of activity, or an 
isolated event; whether it infected the 
entire pleading, or only one particular 
count or defense; whether the person 
has engaged in similar conduct in other 
litigation; whether it was intended to in-
jure; what effect it had on the litigation 
process in time or expense; whether 
the responsible person is trained in the 
law; what amount, given the financial 
resources of the responsible person, is 
needed to deter that person from rep-
etition in the same case; what amount is 
needed to deter similar activity by other 
litigants: all of these may in a particular 
case be proper considerations." 
Supreme Court Order 03·06 
On Dec. 19, 2003, the supreme court 
held a public hearing on joint peti-
tion 03-06 and, at a subsequent public 
admini???ative conference, tentatively 
voted to approve the petition. The peti-
tion was again the subject of a supreme 
court public adminisb·ative conference 
on ov. 16, 2004. On Ylarch 31, 2005, 
Lhe court filed SCO 03-06.5 [tis very 
important to note that the supreme 
court adopted SCO 03-06 on a 4-3 vote. 
Supreme Court Order 03-06 repeals 
Wis. Stat. sections 802.05 and 814.025, 
??fective July 1, 2005, and adopts in 
their place a Wisconsin version of 
?RCP ll, as amended in 1993. 
Supreme Cowt Order 03-06 
consists of a main order entered by 
four justices and strenuous dissents by 
three justices. The dissents to the order 
are considered below, but first it is 
?????????that all practitioners under-
stand how SCO 03-06 will affect their 
practices. A discussion of the substance 
of new Rule 802.05 follows. 
The Safe Harbor 
???Rule 802.05 provides a "safe 
harbor" of21 days for litigants, within 
which time counsel accused of ftivolous 
conduct can escape sanctions if he or 
she withdraws an offending document. 
In other words, a party who wishes to 
seek sanctions may immediately serve 
a motion for sanctions on an offending 
party. However, that motion cannot be 
filed or presented to the court for 21 
days afte'r service. Any party who seeks 
to file the motion or othervvise present 
the motion to the court before the ex-
piration of 21 days (such as by seeking 
a hearing date during that time) risks 
being found in direct violation of Rule 
802.05(3){a). 
Judicial Discretion in Awarding 
Sanctions for Frivolous Condu??
Gone from new Rule 802.05 is the 
suggestion that an aggrieved party can 
automatically use frivolous action rules 
to secure full compensation for the 
achtal costs and attorney fees incurred 
due to allegedly frivolous conduct. New 
Rule 802.05 provides circuit courts 
with wide discretion in determining 
that an act is frivolous and ample guid-
ance and suggestions as to how circuit 
courts can narrowly tailor sanctions to 
correct specific misconduct. New Rule 
802.05(3)(b) provides in part that: "[a] 
sanction imposed for violation of this 
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient 
to deter repetition of such conduct or 
comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated .... The sanction may consist 
of, or include, directives of a nonmon-
etary nature, an order to pay a penalty 
into court, or, if imposed on motion and 
warranted for effective deterrence, an 
order directing payment to the movant 
of some or all of the reasonable attor-
neys' fees and other expenses ... . " 
The flexibility in determining the 
scope of possible remedial responses is 
reinforced by the SCO 03-06 majority's 
comments to new Rule 802.05: "Fac-
tors that the court may consider in 
imposing sanctions include the follow-
ing: (1) Whether the alleged frivolous 
conduct was part of a pattern of activity 
or an isolated event; (2) Whether the 
conduct infected the entire pleading 
or was an isolated claim or defense; 
and (3) Whether the attorney or party 
FRIVOLOUS SANCTIONS 
has engaged in similar conduct in other 
litigation. Sanctions authorized under s. 
802.05{3) may include an award of actual 
fees and costs to the party victimized by 
the frivolous conduct." 
Judicial flexibility in responding 
to allegedly frivolous conduct is also 
emphatically underscored in the 1993 
Federal Notes that are set ????? in SCO 
03-06: 
"The court has available a variety of 
possible sanctions to impose for viola-
tions, such as striking the offending pa-
per; issuing an admonition, reprimand, 
or censure; requiring participation in 
seminars or other educational programs; 
ordering a fine payable to the comt; 
referring the matter to disciplinary 
authorities (or, in the case of govern-
ment attorneys, to the Attorney General, 
Inspector General, or agency head), etc . 
. . . The rule does not attempt to enumer-
ate the factors a court should consider in 
deciding whether to impose a sanction 
or what sanctions would be appropriate 
in the circumstances; but, for emphasis, 
it does specifically note that a sanction 
may be nonmonetary as well as mon-
etary. Whether the improper conduct 
was willful, or negligent; whether it 
was part of a pattern of activity, or an 
isolated event; whether it infected the 
entire pleading, or only one particular 
count or defense; whether the person 
has engaged in similar conduct in other 
litigation; whether it was intended to 
injure; what effect it had on the litiga-
tion process in time or expense; whether 
the responsible person is trained in the 
law; what amount, given the financial 
resources of the responsible person, is 
needed to deter that person from repeti-
tion in the same case; what amount is 
needed to deter similar activity by other 
litigants: all of these may in a particular 
case be proper considerations." 
Limited Permission to Make Factual 
Contentions that Lack Evidentiary 
Support 
ewRule 802.05 specifically allows 
parties and their counsel ample oppor-
tunity to conduct discovery to shore up 
(continued on ????50) 
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??????????19) 
allegations and defenses in complaints, 
answers, and counterclaims. Rule 
802.0,5(2) specifies: 
"(c) The allegations and other ??????
al contentions stated in the paper have 
evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, are likely to have evidentiary 
support after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery. 
"(d) The denials of factual conten-
tions stated in the paper are warranted 
on the evidence or, ifspecifically so 
identified, are reasonably based on a 
lack of infonnation or belief." 
It appears clear that plaintiffs' 
counsel in particular \vill ?ant to be 
very careful to denote with specificity 
the paragraphs in a complaint that "are 
likely to have evidentimy support after 
a reasonable opportunity for f??ther 
investigation or discovery.'' Defense 
counsel will want to be equally as 
careful to denote with specificity those 
paragraphs in an answer that are "rea-
sonably'' based on a lack of information 
or belief. 
Regarding a certification that 
evidentiary support for an allegation 
in a complaint or a paragraph in an 
answer will require ???ther discovery, 
it is important to note just what the 
1993 Federal Notes anticipated in this 
regard. According to the 1993 Notes: 
"[I]f evidentia1y support is not 
obtained after a reasonable opportunity 
for further investigation or discovery, 
the party has a duty under the rule 
not to persist ?ith that contention. 
[The Bule] does not require a formal 
amendment to pleadings for which 
evidentiary support is not obtained, but 
rather calls upon a litigant not thereaf-
ter to advocate such claims or defenses. 
The certification is that there is (or 
likely will be) 'evidentiary support' 
for the allegation, not that the party 
will prevail with respect to its conten-
tion ?????????the fact. ... Denials of 
factualcontentions involve somewhat 
different considerations. Often, of 
course, a denial is premised upon 
the existence of evidence contradict-
ing the alleged ????At other times a 
???????is permissible because, after an 
appropriate investigation, a party has 
no ???????????concerning the matter 
or, indeed, ??? a reasonable basis for 
doubting the credibility of the only evi-
dence relevant to the matter. A party 
should not deny an allegation it knows 
to be true; but it is not required, simply 
because it lacks contradictory evidence, 
to admit an allegation that it believes is 
not true."6 
In the case of plaintiffs' attorneys, 
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the "certification" referred to in the 
above quote from the 1993 Advismy 
Notes is to the requirement in Bule 
802.05(2) that when allegations in 
a complaint are specifically identi-
fied as lacking evidentiary support, 
the plaintiffs' attorney must in effect 
"certify" that such evidentiary support 
will likely be established after a reason-
able opportunity has been afforded 
for further investigation or discoveJy. 
In the case of defense attorneys, the 
"certification" is to the requirement in 
Rule 802.05(2)(d) that when denials 
of f?ctual contentions are specifically 
identified as not warranted by the 
facts, the defense attorney must in ef-
fect "certify" that they are nonetheless 
"reasonably based on a lack of informa-
tion and belief." 
Importance of 1993 Federal 
Advisory Committee Notes 
It is important to emphasize that while 
the majority in SCO 03-06 did repro-
duce the 1993 Fede???Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to FRCP 11, it supplied 
them "for information p??poses only." 
The SCO 03-06 majority nevertheless 
emphatic????signaled that the 1993 
Advismy Committee Notes should be 
given a good deal of respect: 
"FRCP 11 has ... undergone sub-
stantial revision, most recently in 1993. 
The court now adopts the current 
version of?F?CP 11, pursuant [to] its 
authority under s. 751.12 to regulate 
pleading, practice and procedure in 
judici??proceedings. The court's intent 
is to simplify and harmonize the rules 
of pleading, practice and procedure, 
and to promote the speedy determi-
nation of litigation on the merits. In 
adopting the 1993 amendments to 
F?CP 11, the court does not intend to 
deprive a party wronged by frivolous 
conduct of a right to recovery; rather, 
the court intends to provide Wisconsin 
courts vvith additional tools to deal 
with frivolous filing of pleadings and 
other p?pers. Judges and practitioners 
will now be able to look to applicable 
decisions of federal courts since 1993 
for guidance ?? the Interpretation and 
application of the mandates of FRCP 
11 in Wisconsin. "1 
Because they have been repro-
duced as part of new Rule 802.05, the 
1993 Federal Advisory Committee 
otes bear careful study, despite their 
inclusion for "information purposes 
only." One of the points made in the 
1993 Notes relates to the scope of the 
subject matter covered by Wisconsin's 
version of FRCP 11 in Rule 802.05: 
"The rule applies only to asser-
tions contained in papers filed with 
or submitted to the court. It does not 
cover matters arising for the first time 
during oral presentations to the court, 
when counsel may make statements 
that would not have been made if 
there had been more time for study 
and reflection. However, a litigant's 
obligations with respect to the contents 
of these papers are not measured solely 
as of the time they are filed with or 
submitted to the court, but include 
reaffirming to the court and advocating 
positions contained in those pleadings 
and motions after learning that they 
cease to have any me?it." 
Most important, the 1993 Notes 
make it c1ystal clear that the 1993 
version of FRCP 11 was intended to 
remove much of the incentive for satel-
lite litigation, that is, ancillary litiga-
tion undertaken to punish an attorney 
responsible for a frivolous filing for the 
purpose of obtaining full compensation 
for the harm done by frivolous con-
duct. Consider the following language 
from the 1993 Notes in light of the 
facts of the Jandrt decision: 
"Under unusual circumstances ... 
deterrence may be ineffective tmless 
the sanction not only requires the 
person violating the rule to make a 
????????payment, but also directs 
that some or all of this payment be 
made to those injured by the viola-
tion .... Any such award to another 
party, however, should not exceed 
the ????????and attorneys' fees for 
the services directly and unavoidably 
caused by the violation .. . The award 
should not provide compensation far 
seroices that could have been avoided 
??an earlier disclosure of evidence or 
an earlier challenge to the groundless 
claims or defenses. Moreover, partial 
reimbursement of fees may constitute 
a sufficient deterrent with respect to 
violations by persons having modest fi-
nancial resources." [Emphasis added.] 
The Dissents to Order 03·06 
Three justices dissented from the enby 
of SCO 03-06. Justice Prosser wrote 
a dissent in which he underscored his 
objection to the action of the majority 
in repealing section 814.025 on the 
grounds that the supreme cowt had 
thus "obliterated a validly enacted 
statute" of the Wisconsin Legislature 
and eliminated the substantive rights 
of victims of frivolous conduct. 
Justice Roggensack penned a 
much longer dissent, in which Justices 
Prosser and Wilcox joined, setting 
forth in detail the reasons for her 
belief that the majority was in error 
when it entered SCO 03-06. Justice 
Roggensack wrote: "I dissent for two 
reasons. First, this court does not have 
the power under either a statute or 
the constitution to repeal § 814.025, 
because it is a substantive law that was 
duly created by acts of the legislature. 
Second, while this court has the power 
to revise § 802.05 in certain instances 
because it began as a Supreme Court 
rule, the revisions made by the major-
ity are contrary to the interests of the 
public.?? 
In Justice Roggensack's view Rule 
814.025 granted to victims of frivolous 
lawsuits substantive relief, which could 
not be disposed of by a supreme court 
order. Justice Roggensack maintained 
that to allow the supreme court to 
repeal section 814.025 ???????to a 
violation of the separation of pow-
ers under the Constitution. Justice 
Roggensack also stated that new Rule 
802.05 "does much to protect lawyers, 
but it does so at the expense of pro-
tecting the public from the expenses 
incurred in needless litigation." 
Justice Roggensack acknowledged 
the "valid concerns" about access to 
justice raised by the dissent in Jandrt, 
but argued that those concerns could 
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have been addressed without the 
wholesale revision of Rule 802.05 or 
the repeal of Rule 814.025. 
Practical Problems: Should New 
Rule 802.05 Apply Retroactively? 
Practical challenges ?ill arise from 
attempting to enforce this rule in Wis-
consin circuit cowts. The first issue is 
whether new Rule 802.05 should apply 
retroactively to cases that were pend-
ing when it became effective on July 1, 
2005. Research strongly suggests that 
it should apply retroactively.9 
First, the supreme court did not 
repeal either section 802.05 or section 
814.025 and then replace them with 
a rule located outside of the Code of 
Civil Procedure. lew Rule 802.05 was 
made part of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. Furthermore, the recreation 
is based on and clearly derived from 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. As the SCO 03-06 majority 
stated: 
'The court now adopts the current 
version of FRCP 11, pursuant to its 
auth??ity under s. 751.12 to regulate 
pleading, practice and procedure in 
judicial proceedings. The court's intent 
is to simplify and harmonize the rules 
of pleading, practice and procedure, 
and to promote the speedy determina-
tion of litigation on the merits."10 
ew Rule 802.05 is not a statute 
enacted by the legislature. Therefore, 
the rule's retroactivity is not subject 
to the holdings in Ma,rtin v. Richards, 
Neiman v. American National Prop-
erty, or Matthies v. Positive Safety 
Manufacturing, 11 all of which address 
in some measure the issue of whether 
the legislature intended a statute to 
apply retroactively. It is interesting to 
note, however, that even retroactive 
legislation enjoys a presumption of 
constitutionality.12 
ew Rule 802.05 was developed 
by the supreme court following 
lengthy public bearings and after 
lengthy deliberations that spanned 
two years. This new rule represents 
a thoughtful analysis of FRCP 11, as 
??ended in 1993, and is intended to 
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eliminate perceived unfairaspects of 
pre\ious sections 802.05 and ???.025. 
The public and interested organiza-
tions \:vere permitted to submit materi-
als, briefs, and arguments to the ?????
before the new rule was adopted. The 
rule is clearly intended to streamline 
and modernize proceedings concerning 
frivolity and bring them into conformity 
with procedures that now exist in the 
federal arena pursuant to FRCP 11, 
as amended in 1993. In the words of 
the SCO 03-06 majority, "Judges and 
practitioners will now be able to look to 
applicable decisions of federal courts 
since 1993 for guidance in the interpre-
tation and application of the mandates 
of FRCP 11 in Wisconsin." 
Wisconsin cases do not appear 
to have directly addressed the issue 
of amendments to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, however, has held that 
"[a]mendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure should he given 
retroactive application to the ???????
extent possible," 13 and a federal district 
court held that "[i]n determining 
whether the retrospective application of 
[a] rule is 'just and practicable,' [courts 
are] guided by the principle that to the 
maximum extent possible ... arnencled 
Buies should be given retroactive 
application .... "?? 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of amendments to rules of 
civil procedure in Landg??????US?Film 
Products??? and concluded: 
"Changes in procedural rules 
may often be applied in suits arising 
before their enactment without raising 
concerns about retroacti:vitv .... ??
noted the diminished relianceinterests 
in matters of procedure .. 337 U.S., at 
71, 69 S. Ct., at 952-953. Because rules 
of procedure regulate secondary rather 
than ???????conduct, the fact that a 
new procedural rule was instituted after 
the conduct giving rise to the suit does 
not make application of the rule at ?????
retroactive. Cf McBurney v. Carson, 99 
U.S. 567, 569,25 L. Ed. 378 (1879) .... 
While we have strictly construed the Ex 
Post Facto Clause to prohibit applica-
tion of new statutes creating or increas~ 
ing punishments after the fact, we have 
upheld intervening procedural changes 
even if application of the new rule 
operated to a defendant's disadvantage 
in the particular case."16 
As the Fourth Circuit noted in 
Altizerv. Deeds, "[t]hc Supreme Court 
has upheld procedural changes even 
\vhere they ?ork to the disadvantage 
of defendants in pending cases. See . , . 
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 ... 
(1990): Bertzell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 
46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (192.5)). 17 
New Rule 802.0.5 did not arise from 
a specific decision of the ?isconsin 
Supreme Court ?ithin the context of a 
pending case. However, with respect to 
such decisions, the supreme court has 
established that retroactive applica-
tion of a procedural decision in a civil 
action is ordinarily to be favoredAs the 
court has noted, ??isconsin generally 
adheres to the doctrine that retroactive 
application of judicial decisions is the 
rule, not the exception."??As the court 
stated f??ther in Bradley, in the case of 
civil procedure rules "retroactive ap-
plication is presume?."19 
Even ?hen a procedur?l rule 
results ??om the decision in a particular 
case, the preferred course is to apply 
the rule retroactively. In Harper v. 
Virginia Department ??Taxation, 20 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held: 
"When this Court applies a rule of 
federal law to the parties before it, that 
rule is the controlling ??????????????
of federal law and must be given full 
retroactive elTect in all cases still open 
on direct review and as to all events, re-
gardless of whether such events predate 
or postdate our announcement of the 
rule."2 t 
Wisconsin appellate courts have 
taken a similar approach to new pro-
cedural rules developed in the course 
of litigation. Our courts refer to the 
concept of "sunbursting," which is a 
terrn used for prospective application 
of a rule developed within the common 
law as well as changes in the way that 
courts interpret statutes. According to 
In re Thie?:22 "[L]imiting a ne\v rule to 
prospecbve application only or 'sun-
bursting' is appropriate only if there is 
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a compellh1g judicial reason to limit its 
application to future litigants."23 
Appropriate Sanctions Under New 
Rule 802.05 
As noted in SCO 03-06, "Judges and 
practitioners will now be able to look to 
applicable decisions of federal courts 
since 1993 for guidance in the interpre-
tation and application of the mandates 
of FRCP 11 in Wisconsin." Since the 
amendment of FRCP 11 in 1993, courts 
have repeatedly stated that the basic 
principle under F?CP 11 is that the 
least severe sanction adequate to deter 
misconduct is the one that should he 
imposed. According to the court in White 
v. Camden City Board?of??????????:24 
"Any sanction imposed under Rule 11 
'should be calibrated to the least severe 
level necessary to serve the deterrent 
purpose of the Hule,' ???u. Eastern 
Fa. Psychiatric lnst. ??????Me?? College 
of Fa., 103 F .. 3d 294, 301 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citing 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 1?36 (2d eel. Supp. 1996)), and may 
include monetary sanctions, reprimands, 
orders to undergo continuing legal 
education, and referrals to disciplin??y 
authorities, see Zuk, 103 F.3d at 301."25 
In Zuk v. Eastern Pennsylvania 
Psychiatric Institute, the court stated 
that: "[t]he 1993 revision ... makes clear 
that the main purpose of ?ule l.l. is to 
deter, not to compensate. Accordingly, 
it changes the emphasis in the types of 
sanctions to be ordered. It envisions as 
the norm public interest remedies such 
as fines and reprimands, as opposed to 
the prior emphasis on private interest 
remedies. Thus, the Ad??????Committee 
Notes state that any monet??y penalty 
'should ordinmily be paid into the court' 
except 'under unusual circumstances'. 
Any sanction imposed should be cali-
brated to the least severe level neces-
sary to serve the deterrent pmpose of 
the Rule. In addition, the new Rule 11 
contemplates greater use of ???????????
sanctions, including reprimands, orders 
to undergo continuing education, and 
referrals to disciplinmy authorities."" 
According to Leuallen v. Borough of 
Paulsboro: "Thus, an 'appropriate' sanc-
tion may be 'a warm-friendly discussion 
on the record, a hard-nosed repii-
mand in open court, compulsory legal 
education, monetary sanctions, or other 
measures appropriate to circumstances.' 
The sanction must be the least severe 
sanction adequate to meet the purpose 
of the sanctions and must be tailored to 
the particular facts of each case.'>27 
In a similar vein, the court in Augus-
tine v. Adams stated: "'[T]he primary 
purpose of sanctions is to deter attorney 
and litigant misconduct, not to compen-
sate the opposing party for its costs in 
defending a frivolous suit.' White, 908 
F.2d at 684. The amount of sanctions 
must be the minimum amount neces-
sary to deter future violations."28 It is 
true that courts must take an offending 
party's ability to pay into consideration 
in imposing FRCP 11 sanctions, but not 
in the same way a court or jury would 
do when assessing punitive damages. 
According to Kassab v. Aetna 
Industries: 
"The principal goal of Rule 11 sanc-
tions is deterrence, with compensation 
to the ?????forced to litigate an improp-
????filed claim being a secondary aim. 
Orlett v. Cincinnati Microwave, Inc., 
954 F.2d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 1992); see 
also Danvers v. Danvers, 959 F.2d 601, 
605 (6th Cir. 1992). A claim for a party's 
total costs requires an investigation 
into the reasonableness of those costs. 
???????954 F.2d at 419; see ?????Boden-
hamer, 989 F.2d at 217 ('the amount of 
the sanction must be reasonable'); Dan-
vers, 959 F.2d at 605 ('because deter-
rence is the primary goal, the minimum 
necessary to deter the sanctioned party 
is the proper award, even if this ??????
does not fully compensate the moving 
??????? (emphasis in original). Before 
awarding a party's total costs and fees 
assanctions, the district court should 
consider the offending party's ability to 
pay, want of diligence, and the amount 
necessary and effective to bring about 
deterrence. "29 
It is very in1portant to emphasize 
that "compensable fees under Rule 11 
should be limited to those incurred 
??a result of the offensive pleading; a 
blanket award of all fees incurred dur-
ing litigation is not authorized under 
Rule 11."30 Courts have emphasized 
that under FRCP 11, as amended in 
1993, the imposition of sanctions is 
very much a function of educating the 
bar. In Shepherdson v. Nigro, the court 
admonished counsel to exercise more 
care in future cases.31 
FRIVOLOU S SANCTIONS 
Courts should very carefully 
scrutinize claims for attorney fees 
under FRCP 11 to determine whether 
the fee requests are reasonable and 
whether the fees were incurred as 
a result of the allegedly frivolous 
conduct. In Elsman v. Standard Fed. 
Bank, the court stated: 
"A claim for a party's total costs 
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requires an investigation into the 
reasonableness of those costs. Orlett v. 
Cincinnati Microwave, Inc., 954 F.2d 
414 (6th Cir. 1992). Before awarding a 
party's total costs and fees as sanctions, 
the district court should consider the 
offending party's ability to pay, want of 
diligence, and the amount necessmy 
and effective to bring about deter-
rence. I d. Compensable fees under 
?ule 11 should be limited to those 
incurred as a result of the offensive 
pleading. See Bodenhamer Bldg. Corp. 
v. Architecturalllesearch C??p., 989 
F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1993). Further, 
when granting Rule 11 attorney fees 
on remand, the district court must re-
view such costs with exacting scrutiny; 
a blanket award of all fees inc??red 
d??ing litigation is not authorized 
under ?ule 11. "32 
???ever, as the E?sman court 
makes clear, while courts should 
carefully and strictly review an award 
of actual and reasonable attorney fees, 
such an award is not precluded in an 
appropriate case.???
Dismissal is a legitimate FRCP 11 
sanction''4 and in and of itself is a vety 
strong and severe sanction.3·5 
Conclusion 
The 1993 Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Notes make it very dear that the 
touchstone of new Rule 802.05 should 
be equity and the ???????????????of 
response to an allegedly frivolous act. 
This is a refreshing development in the 
jurisprudence of Wisconsin, and one 
that can and should lead to an increase 
in civility in our litigational process. ?e 
hope that ?isconsin practitioners ???
judges take the time to study both the 
text of new ????802.0.5 and the 199:3 
Federal Advisorv Committee Notes. 
Those Notes providerich insight into 
the spirit of F?CP 11, as amended in 
199.3. Moreover; counsel will discover 
that the case law that has come ????
under F?CP ll, as amended in 1993, 
serves to underscore the 1993 Notes. 
Although the 1993 Federal Ad-
vismy Notes have been reproduced 
?????????new Rule 802.05 only for 
information pnrposes, it is well to 
remember that the SCO 0:3-06 court 
majority stated: "Judges and prac-
titioners will now be able to look to 
applicable decisions of federal courts 
since 1993 for guidance in the interpre-
tation and application of the mandates 
of?FRCP 11 in Wisconsin." Fnlljudicial 
discretion, equity, and fair play have 
now been returned to frivolous sanction 
practice in ?isconsin, and this develop-
ment can only serve the best interests 
of the Judiciaty, the bar, and the general 
public. 
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